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A More Acceptable Solution:
The Proposed European Union
Agency of Asylum and Refugees
Sarah Katz*
This Note details the improvements that should be
made to a recent proposal submitted by a group of
scholars to the European Parliament. The scholars have
suggested that the European Union create an
independent organization to process asylum
applications and to deal with refugee issues in the
European Union. This Note agrees with this central
proposal, but fleshes out more details that are missing
from this initial proposition. The five aspects of refugee
processing are detailed in turn: (1) defining a refugee;
(2) assigning responsibility for dealing with asylum
claims; (3) reception conditions; (4) temporary
protection; and (5) long-term residence conditions. The
new agency should clarify the scope of the definition of
a refugee in order to create a more uniform asylum
application process. The Dublin Convention should be
abandoned as the determining doctrine for which State
will process asylum applications. Reception sites should
be given financial assistance and European Union
representatives should be placed at the sites. Once a
refugee is granted temporary protection, he or she
should have the opportunity to move freely for
employment. Each State should be encouraged to submit
a survey detailing its needs to the new agency so that the
agency can determine the best fit for the relocation of
individual refugees. This Note also suggests that the
proposed agency create programs that would promote
tolerance and acceptance of refugees, and further
emphasizes the need to find a solution that will be
accepted by all Member States of the European Union.
This Note aims to advance this acceptance by
highlighting the needs of the Member States as an
important factor in refugee relocation determination.
* J.D. Candidate at Case Western Reserve University School of Law, class
of 2017. Senior editor of the Case Western Reserve Journal of
International Law.
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I. Introduction
In 2015, the European Union (EU) received around one million
asylum applications, making it the largest European refugee crisis since
World War II.1 The EU’s current policy on asylum granting has proven
1. Beatrice Cretu, How Syria’s Neighbors and The European Union are
Handling the Refugee Crisis, ROMANIAN J. OF HISTORY AND INT’L STUDIES
2(2) 245, 255 (2015).
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problematic. The EU has committed itself to creating a united plan on
asylum,2 but the structure that is currently in place, the Common
European Asylum System (CEAS), is not implemented uniformly by
the Member States. This has caused great stress on the Union.
Many solutions have been proposed to address the problematic
nature of processing asylum seekers within the EU, but most of these
proposals are burden-shifting proposals.3 The EU Member States have
repeatedly attempted to shift the burden of processing and accepting
refugees outside their sovereign borders. Rather than shifting the
burden outside of the EU or to another Member State, the EU should
form a cohesive plan that addresses how to share the burden. This plan
should be devised so that it can be implemented relatively uniformly
between Member States to relieve the current tension within the Union.
Recently, scholars have submitted a suggestion for such a unified
response to the European Parliament.4 These scholars have suggested
in their submission, entitled “Enhancing the Common European
Asylum System and Alternatives to Dublin,” the creation of an
independent organization that would centralize the refugee asylum
determination process.5 This scholarly submission focuses on the
refugees’ right to choose freely where they want to settle.6 This Note
agrees with the proposition that an independent organization should be
created. However, this Note suggests that the European Parliament
should not focus on refugee freedom, but rather on a multi-factored
analysis of the EU member States’ needs and obligations.
While the solution of creating an independent organization is a solid
unifying suggestion, the emphasis on refugee free choice is not practical.
One of the biggest reasons for the stress on the EU is that no State can
afford to bear a disproportionate burden of refugee acceptance.
Deferring to the preference of the refugees does not resolve this problem
and is a solution that most States will not accept. This is not to say
that the proposed agency should ignore refugee settlement preference
entirely. Rather, refugee preference should only be a factor in a larger
2. Under the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU), the EU must
develop a “common policy on asylum, subsidiary protection, and
temporary protection with a view to offering appropriate status to any
third-country national requiring international protection.” Consolidated
Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art.
78(1), May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. C 326/47, at 76 [hereinafter TFEU].
3. These proposals are discussed in detail in Section III.C of this Note.
4. Study of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs on
Enhancing the Common European Asylum System and Alternative to
Dublin, at 1 (Jul. 2015),
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2015/519234/I
POL_STU(2015)519234_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/A6QN-BBBT]
[hereinafter LIBE Committee Study].
5. Id. at 58.
6. Id. at 59.
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evaluation process. Resettlement should not be entirely up to the
individual applicant.
This Note argues that a more acceptable evaluation process will be
one where the Member States of the EU are able to submit statistics
regarding their needs and ability to accommodate immigrants. Any
uniform plan must use administrative coordination to balance economic
interests, State sovereignty, and human-rights interests. To disregard
any of these factors is to develop an unsustainable plan. This Note
fleshes out a model plan for an independent organization that will
effectively balance these factors. Part I discusses the standard of
international and EU refugee law. Part II addresses why the EU’s
previous tactics of externalizing the “refugee problem” have failed. And
Part III outlines a proposal for the step-by-step process under which
the suggested unified EU body should process refugee applications.
II. Part I: A Unified Response has Proven Problematic
Because Individual EU Member States have been
Separately Handling the Refugee Application Process
Both international and EU agreements acknowledge the importance
of protecting refugees. The EU has committed itself to attacking this
issue with a unified response.7 But, immigration is an issue that
individual States have handled. The tension between the unified goal
and the nationalized policies has resulted in inefficient solutions to date.
Each State does not see itself as a player in a unified front, but rather
is looking out for its own citizens’ interests. This is why any proposed
unified plan must clearly lay out the roles of all Member States.
A. International Refugee Law Provides Definitions that Form the Basis
of the Discussion of the Refugee Crisis
Before discussing refugee law in Europe, it is necessary to define
the terms used in this field. The European system classifies migrants
into two categories: economic migrants and asylum seekers. An
“economic migrant” is a person who is relocating to a new country for
the purpose of seeking a better life or more job opportunities.8 An
“asylum seeker” is a person who has fled persecution or conflict and is
seeking international protection under the 1951 Refugee Convention.9
Finally, “refugee” is the status granted to an individual after the proper
authorities determine that the asylum seeker is indeed protected by the
7. TFEU, supra note 2.
8. Jeanne Park, Europe’s Migration Crisis, COUNSEL ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS, Sep. 23, 2015, at 2 http://www.cfr.org/migration/europes-
migration-crisis/p32874 [https://perma.cc/6JZY-KMYZ].
9. Id.
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1951 Convention.10 Often the lines between these categories are blurred.
The most important distinction between these two categories is that an
economic migrant can be sent back to his or her country of origin, while
a refugee cannot be sent back to his or her country of origin under the
internationally accepted principle of non-refoulement.11
International Refugee Law has taken its modern form through the
1951 United Nations Convention on Human Rights (Geneva
Convention) and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.
The 1951 Convention stated in Article 33 that “no Contracting State
shall expel or return (‘refouler’) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to
the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened
on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular
social group or political opinion.”12 This is the principle of non-
refoulement.13 The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights is legally
binding on all EU institutions and Member States in the same way that
EU treaties are binding.14 Article 18 of the Charter says that “the right
to asylum shall be guaranteed with respect for the rules of the Geneva
Convention.”15 This means that all EU Member States are required not
to return an asylum seeker to a life-threatening situation.
10. Id.
11. Livia Elena Bacaian, The Protection of Refugees and Their Right to Seek
Asylum in the European Union, 20 (Jan. 26, 2011) (unpublished Master’s
Thesis, European Institute of the University of Geneva) (on file with the
University of Geneva),
https://www.unige.ch/gsi/files/6614/0351/6348/Bacaian.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7M9J-QE76].
12. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 33, Jul. 28, 1951, 189
U.N.T.S. 150.
13. U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Note on Non-Refoulement, U.N.
Doc. EC/SCP/2 (Aug. 23, 1977), http://www.unhcr.org/en-
us/excom/scip/3ae68ccd10/note-non-refoulement-submitted-high-
commissioner.html [https://perma.cc/B548-QN63].
14. Pavel Pyszko, Feasibility of the Extra-Territorial Processing of Asylum
Applications by Member States of the European Union, 14 (Sept. 2015)
(unpublished Master’s Thesis, Leiden University) (on file with Leiden
Repository, Leiden University),
https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/handle/1887/36140
[https://perma.cc/DFD8-BVW7].
15. Id.
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B. Current EU Refugee Law and Its Inadequate State
1. Law Requires that the EU Practice Nonrefoulement
The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, which is legally
binding upon the Member States, provides for (1) the right to asylum,
and (2) prohibits refoulement.16
Even though the Charter provides for the right to asylum, it does
not provide a system that facilitates asylum seekers’ entry to the EU.17
Therefore, the EU is only obliged to protect asylum seekers once they
have arrived on the shores of the EU, but has no obligations toward
asylum seekers before that point. This is one of the reasons that much
of the EU policy has focused on preventing asylum seekers from
reaching the shores of the EU.
The EU States have agreed to create a common policy to facilitate
asylum seekers entry, but have yet to successfully follow through on
this agreement. Under the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU
(TFEU), the EU must develop a “common policy on asylum, subsidiary
protection, and temporary protection with a view to offering
appropriate status to any third-country national requiring international
protection.”18 Further, the policy must be in accordance with the 1951
Geneva Convention and the 1967 Protocol,19 which means that the
policy must respect the principle of non-refoulement.
2. The Schengen Agreement and Its Effect on Asylum Claims
The Schengen agreement is an agreement that binds all
participating States to common visa regulations.20 Schengen allows
member citizens of the EU to travel between borders for work or
education without visas. Articles 30 through 34 of the Schengen
Implementation Convention of 1990 established the concept that only
one of the Schengen States could process an individual’s asylum
application to avoid having “refugees in orbit.”21 These articles formed
the foundation for the Dublin Convention.22 The Dublin Convention
16. Mikko Viljami Hakkarainen, EU Visa Policy: A Bastion of Exclusion or
Patron of Refugees—The Case of the Humanitarian Visa, 10 (Aug. 2014)
(unpublished dissertation, University of Helsinki) (on file with Digital
Reposition of the University of Helsinki),
https://helda.helsinki.fi/bitstream/handle/10138/157477/GraduHakkara
inen(final).pdf?sequence=2 [https://perma.cc/L5EM-M6CF].
17. Id. at 11.
18. TFEU, supra note 2, at art. 78(1).
19. TFEU, supra note 2, at art. 78(1).
20. Emek M. Ucarer,Managing Asylum and European Integration: Expanding
Spheres of Exclusion, 2 INT’L STUDIES PERSPECTIVES 288, 296 (2001).
21. Id.
22. Id.
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places responsibility for the examination of an asylum claim on the
State that the asylum seeker first entered.23
The Schengen structure has allowed asylum seekers to apply for
refugee status in one State and then freely move to any other State in
the EU afterward.24 This free movement causes two significant problems
in managing asylum cases.
The first problem is that the Schengen structure creates a greater
risk that a refugee may be deported. While an individual asylum seeker
may be approved for refugee status in one EU State, that individual
might not be considered a refugee in another EU State.25 This is because
each State has a different standard by which it determines whether an
individual asylum seeker qualifies as a refugee. The result is that if a
“refugee” uses the open borders created by Schengen to travel among
the EU States, then he or she may be considered an illegal immigrant
susceptible to deportation upon reaching a new State.
Second, free movement of refugees creates a disproportionate
burden on the countries that asylum seekers perceive to be more
economically attractive.26 Because refugees often want to move to
countries that they view as more economically stable, refugees will tend
to want to migrate away from the countries in which they arrive to
more desirable countries.
C. The Tension between the EU Goals and EU Policies
The EU has tried to compensate for its Schengen policy as it applies
to immigration and asylum through the Common European Asylum
System (CEAS), but this System is poorly implemented.27 The members
of the EU follow the minimum standards set out by the CEAS to create
23. Dublin Regulation, EUROPEAN COUNCIL ON REFUGEES AND EXILES,
http://www.unhcr.org/4a9d13d59.pdf [https://perma.cc/CAM5-9823].
24. Kiran Phull & John Sutliffe, Crossroads of Integration? The Future of
Schengen in the Wake of the Arab Spring, in THE EU AND THE EUROZONE
CRISIS: POLICY CHALLENGES AND STRATEGIC CHOICES, 177–95, 183 (Finn
Laursen, 2016).
25. See Patricia Rodda, Decision-Making Processes and Asylum Claims in
Europe: An Empirical Analysis of Refugee Characteristics and Asylum
Application Outcomes, 23 DECYZJE 23, 24 (2015) (discussing how each
European nation has a different process).
26. See id. (explaining how by accepting more refugees, nations perceived to
be more economically attractive began to feel fatigued).
27. Joanne van Selm, Are Asylum and Immigration Really a European Union
Issue?, FORCED MIGRATION REV. 51, 61 (Jan. 2016), available at
http://www.fmreview.org/destination-europe; Esztella Varga, Refugee
Problem in Europe—Case Studies, 3(4) EURASIAN J. OF SOCIAL SCIENCE
37, 38 (2015),
http://eurasianpublications.com/Eurasian-Journal-of-Social-
Sciences/Vol.3-No.4-2015-4.pdf [https://perma.cc/GB5T-44AY].
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their own unique policies and procedures for dealing with asylum
seekers.28 Leaders continue to say that this is a “European issue,” but
in actual policy and practice, the migration issues are dealt with at a
national level, not in a cooperative union manner.29 Critics are skeptical
that an EU-level agreement regarding asylum can be reached or
implemented.30 In fact, Joanne Selms has said that “the insistence on
the need for a European solution might be the most significant barrier
to straightforward bilateral or multilateral agreements between
Member States and their neighbors on border control.”31
While Selms insists that the best solution is for individual nation
States to create appropriate independent policies that respect each
State’s own demographics, individualized policies are not working for
the EU. Such a “solution” causes stress on the Union and is not
conducive to providing appropriate relief to refugees or to the Member
States.
III. Part II: The EU’s Previous Proposed Solutions to
the Refugee Crisis have Been Unsuccessful Due to
Focus on Externalization
The EU has tried various measures to resolve the refugee crisis.
Most of these measures have focused on externalizing the problem.
“Externalization” occurs when a country shifts the burdens associated
with migration, such as border controls and migration management,
outside of the country’s jurisdiction.32 The term “externalization” has
been used to define the system of offshoring the migration process.33
Due to the unique nature of the EU as a union of sovereign States,
this Note uses the term “externalization” in a more expansive sense to
include any plan that would place the burden of asylum processing on
another party. Shifting the burden of migration or asylum application
processing to another Member State has a similar effect as shifting the
burden out of the EU entirely. Both the EU as a whole and the
individual Member States have externalized the refugee migration
problem rather than provide solutions to the burdens on their own
28. Selm, supra note 27, at 62.
29. Selm, supra note 27, at 61.
30. Selm, supra note 27, at 62.
31. Selm, supra note 27, at 62.
32. Christina Boswell, The ‘External Dimension’ of EU Immigration and
Asylum Policy, 79 INT’L AFFAIRS 619, 622 (2003).
33. Zara Rabinovitch, Pushing Out the Boundaries of Humanitarian
Screening with In-Country and Offshore Processing, MIGRATION POL’Y
INST. (Oct. 16, 2014), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/pushing-
out-boundaries-humanitarian-screening-country-and-offshore-processing.
[[https://perma.cc/73T9-WP9G].
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shores. Tactics employed by the EU include preventing asylum seekers
from arriving in the EU, returning asylum seekers to other safe
countries, or allowing the burden of processing asylum seekers to lie
with other Member States within the Union.34
The EU could internalize the problem by focusing on solutions that
assist in the processing and accepting of asylum seekers. A focus on
externalizing rather than internalizing has caused the Union to have
unclear and disparate standards in determining refugee status,
accepting asylum seekers, and assimilating asylum seekers. This has put
tension on the Union and threatens to break down much of what the
Union has accomplished.
A. Europe has Attempted to Deal with the Crisis in International Waters
One externalizing tactic that the EU employed to deal with the
refugee crisis was to approach the crisis in international waters. From
October 2013–2014, Italy ran a search and rescue: Operation Mare
Nostrum.35 This operation was discontinued due to lack of funding and
was replaced by Operation Triton.36 The new operation, Operation
Triton, focused on preventing refugees from reaching the border rather
than on rescuing the refugees at sea.37 This resulted in increased refugee
deaths38 and indirect refoulement.39
Indirect refoulement occurs when asylum seekers are not physically
deported to their countries of origin, but are prevented from making a
meaningful plea for asylum.40 When asylum seekers are prevented from
reaching land and thereby prevented from the invoking of the Dublin
Convention, it is an example of indirect refoulement.41
34. One scholar has suggested that this externalization is a problem stemming
from fear of economic, social, and political hardship that the EU Member
States believe would accompany measures allowing resettlement of
refugees in the EU. Paolo Biondi, Human security and external burden-
sharing: the European approach to refugee protection between past and
present, 20 THE INT’L J. OF HUMAN RIGHTS 2, 212–13 (2015).
35. Cretu, supra note 1, at 255; Varga, supra note 27, at 38.
36. Cretu, supra note 1, at 255.
37. Cretu, supra note 1, at 255.
38. Cretu, supra note 1, at 255.
39. Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, App. No. 27765/09 (2012) (holding that
Italian authorities violated Article 3 of the European Convention on
Human Rights because they returned a ship with 200 migrants to Libya
without considering the risk that some of the migrants may qualify for
asylum, and because Libya would not provide adequate protection for
refugees); Hakkarainen, supra note 16, at 8.
40. Moira Sy, UNHCR and Preventing Indirect Refoulement in Europe, 27(3)
INT J REFUGEE L. 457, 469 (2015).
41. Id.
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Sanctions on carriers for transferring undocumented migrants have
caused carriers to refuse to transport anyone without a passport or
visa.42 Scholars have noted that this is a problem because the carriers
are not trained nor do they have the means to make a determination
regarding refugee status.43 These tactics, again, externalized the
problem by merely addressing who can and cannot arrive on the shores
of the EU, but did not address what the refugees will do once they
arrive on shore.
B. Europe has Suggested Establishing Off-Shore Processing Centers
Another tactic that has externalized the refugee crisis is the
suggestion of off-shoring the problem by having a refugee processing
area outside the EU borders. In the early 2000’s Tony Blair (then
United Kingdom Prime Minister) and Otto Schilly (then German
Interior Minister) suggested that off-shore processing centers would be
an appropriate solution.44 Blair further suggested that asylum seekers
could be sent back to these offshore centers.45 The suggestion was based
on Australia’s systematic offshore processing. The plan was rejected as
politically not feasible.46 Not only was this suggestion not politically
stable, but it could have led to human rights violations. There is
extensive documentation of human rights violations in the Australian
system.47 Scholar Pavel Pyszko points out that Article 5 of the
European Convention on Human Rights says that detention is only
legal for non-compliance of a legal order of a court or for the purposes
of securing legal obligations. 48 Pyszko says that this is one of the factors
that prevents an off-shore center from being legally feasible.49
Additionally, the tactic of pushing a problem elsewhere does not relieve
the EU of its burdens under international law.
C. Europe has Sent the Refugees to Other Countries
The European doctrine of “Safe Third Country” stands for the idea
that if an applicant had traveled through a listed safe country of origin,
then they must apply in the State through which they passed.50 “Safe
Country” lists have led to indirect refoulement, because each EU State
42. Hakkarainen, supra note 16, at 14.
43. LIBE Committee Study, supra note 4, at 22.
44. LIBE Committee Study, supra note 4, at 36.
45. LIBE Committee Study, supra note 4, at 22.
46. Pyszko, supra note 14, at 2.
47. Pyszko, supra note 14, at 2.
48. Pyszko, supra note 14, at 20.
49. Pyszko, supra note 14, at 20.
50. Ucarer, supra note 20, at 294.
CaseWesternReserve Journal of International Law 49 (2017)
A More Acceptable Solution
313
determines their own list of safe countries and there is no cohesive
standard. Most EU states adopted Safe Country standards during the
1980s.51
D. The Quotas Approach Externalized the Problem by Abandoning All
Standards
The “Quotas Approach” was the first attempt by the EU to
internalize the influx problem. In response to the shipwreck disasters
off the shores of Lampedusa in April 2015, the European Commission
proposed a quota system in which 40,000 asylum seekers would be
relocated from Italy and Greece to the other Member States.52 The
Quotas Approach has been criticized for being unenforceable under the
Schengen agreement. Additionally, many EU States will not agree to
abide by the quotas prescribed by the EU.
The Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary rejected this proposal
as an infringement on State sovereignty.53 It also troubled the Member
States that Denmark, Ireland, and the U.K. would not be legally bound
to this plan, because of opt-out clauses in the AFSJ.54 Because of these
issues, the European Council did not approve this plan.55
The problem with the Quotas Approach is that, even though it is
a step towards internalization, the plan doesn’t entirely internalize the
problem. Assigning each country an amount of refugees that it must
accept without providing any unifying standard for determining why or
how the refugees are distributed doesn’t help the States figure out how
to assimilate these refugees into their culture. The States still need to
deal with asylum application processing, determine refugee status, and
figure out how to assimilate long-term refugees. The Quotas Approach
is not an integrated approach that provides long-term solutions to the
problems faced by the States. This approach merely asks each country
to abandon its current asylum application standards in favor of no
standard at all.
E. The EU’s Current Unified Plan is Not Uniformly Implemented by All
Member States
The EU is obligated under Article 78 TFEU to develop a uniform
policy on international protection.56 The current Asylum Procedures for
the EU are governed by the Common European Asylum System
(CEAS). This System is composed of five elements: (1) the Asylum
51. Ucarer, supra note 20, at 294.
52. Pyszko, supra note 14, at 7–8.
53. Pyszko, supra note 14, at 8.
54. Pyszko, supra note 14, at 8.
55. Pyszko, supra note 14, at 8.
56. LIBE Committee Study, supra note 4, at ii.
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Procedures Directive; (2) the Reception Conditions Directive; (3) the
Qualification Directive; (4) the Dublin Regulation; and (5) the Eurodac
Regulation, which requires that all member States collect fingerprints
of the asylum seekers and organize and record them in a central
database.57
The Asylum Procedures Directive provides three exceptions to
consideration of asylum applications. The EU does not need to consider
asylum applications from applicants if: (1) another country has granted
asylum to the applicant or if the applicant has a pending asylum
application in a non-EU State; (2) it is a subsequent application from
a previously rejected applicant; or (3) the applicant has “sufficient
connections” to a safe third country and “there are grounds for
considering that the applicant will be admitted or readmitted to that
county.”58
Of these three exceptions, the third exception is most problematic.
The Directive provides no definition of “sufficient connection.”59
National law defines “sufficient connection.”60 This allows countries to
interpret these phrases very loosely.61 Additionally, the Directive
specifies that a country may only be considered a “safe country of
origin” if the applicant is of that country’s nationality or has habitually
resided in that country.62 This only clarifies the definition of “origin.”
The standards for qualifying as a “safe third country” that are outlined
in the Directive only serve to prohibit refoulement, but it is open to the
Member States and their national law to determine, on a case-by-case
basis, which countries qualify as “safe.”63 This leads to an inconsistent
listing of countries to which asylum seekers may be safely returned.
The current “unified” plan implemented by the Justice and Home
Affairs Council is another quota system.64 This plan distributes 120,000
refugees across the EU States.65 The plan includes family connections
57. Pyszko, supra note 14, at 18.
58. Pyszko, supra note 14, at 20–21.
59. Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of
26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing
international protection (recast2013 O.J. (L 180)) 64, ¶44 [hereinafter EU
Directive].
60. Id.
61. Pyszko, supra note 14, at 18.
62. EU Directive, supra note 59, at art. 36.
63. EU Directive, supra note 59, at art. 38.
64. Cretu, supra note 1, at 256.
65. Cretu, supra note 1, at 256.
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and language skills in determining where a refugee will be sent.66 Each
EU State will receive 6000 euro per refugee from the EU funds.67
Quota systems do not work because they are not helpful to the
Member States. Instead of providing a uniform system to assist in the
process of migration procedures, a quota system merely dictates what
the result of individual State’s systems must be. This leaves States with
little incentive to participate. The U.K., Ireland, and Denmark have
opted out of participating in this plan.68 Hungary, the Czech Republic,
Slovakia, and Romania all voted against the decision to implement this
plan.69 Hungary has constructed a razor-wire fence along its borders to
keep refugees out.70 Croatia, Slovenia, Austria, and Bulgaria are all
considering doing the same.71
IV. Part III: Proposal for a More Cohesive Plan
The past 20 years have brought up the same issues for discussion:
(1) defining a refugee; (2) assigning responsibility for dealing with
asylum claims; (3) reception conditions; (4) temporary protection; and
(5) long-term residence conditions.72 These issues are organized in the
temporal order in which the EU deals with a refugee case. This Note
will address each of these issues in the same order and will describe how
the proposed independent organization should more clearly develop
each of these five issues.
In their 2015 CEPS Paper submitted to the European Parliament,
scholars suggested the creation of an agency whose sole purpose would
be to deal with asylum applications and refugee processing.73 The Paper
66. Cretu, supra note 1, at 256.
67. Cretu, supra note 1, at 256.
68. Cretu, supra note 1, at 256.
69. Cretu, supra note 1, at 256.
70. Cretu, supra note 1, at 257.
71. Cretu, supra note 1, at 257.
72. Selm, supra note 27, at 61.
73. LIBE Committee Study, supra note 4, at iii; see Guy Goodwin-Gill,
Refugees and Migrants at Sea: Duties of Care and Protection in the
Mediterranean and the Need for International Action, JMCEMIGRANTS
(May 11, 2015), available at
http://www.jmcemigrants.eu/category/working-papers/ (suggesting the
creation of an EU institution for uniformity between Member States); see
also RICHARDWILLIAMS, BEYOND DUBLIN—A DISCUSSION PAPER FOR THE
GREENS/EFA IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 23 (2015), available at
http://www.greens-
efa.eu/legacy/fileadmin/dam/Documents/Policy_papers/Migration_asy
lum/Beyond_Dublin_paper_final.pdf [http://perma.cc/G4QK-FWZJ]
(suggesting the creation of a European Asylum Service for consistency
throughout the Union).
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suggests that the agency be funded by the Asylum, Migration, and
Integration Fund (AMIF), or through support from the EU budget.74
This scholarly suggestion is on the right track. An independent agency
comprised of representatives from each country could unify the
decision-making process regarding asylum applications and thereby
accomplish the goals of the CEAS to develop a unified plan to deal with
the refugee crisis.
The CEPS Paper places great emphasis on the refugee’s right to
self-determination.75 These scholars propose that by giving asylum
seekers the opportunity to apply to the State of their choice for asylum,
the free-movement problems inherent in the Schengen structure will be
resolved.76 They posit that a focus on the refugee’s desires will stop
refugee movement because the refugees will be living where they want
to live.77
The first problem with this Paper lies in its attempt to focus asylum
application processing on the refugees’ preferences. While the
suggestion of a unified independent organization is an excellent one that
internalizes the problem of the refugee crisis, the scholars’ focus on self-
determination is not practical. A State cannot and will not accept an
unlimited number of refugees. The number of refugees that desire to
live in a certain State does not change that State’s capacity to acquire
new citizens. There are two or more parties involved in this decision. A
successful process is one that considers more than one party’s needs. It
is essential that both the refugees and Member States have their needs
weighed in any decision.
The second problem with the Paper is the lack of guidance. The
2015 CEPS Paper suggests that there be a creation of an independent
organization, but does not delve into the details of how the organization
should be structured.
The rest of this Note describes with greater detail a suggested
framework for an independent EU refugee organization. Further, this
Note posits that for a unified plan to succeed, all of the EU member
States must accept the plan. To this end, this Note promotes a shift in
focus from a refugee-determined relocation process to an EU-balanced
determination process. This Note emphasizes that a successful
organization should focus on balancing economic incentives with the
74. LIBE Committee Study, supra note 4, at iii.
75. See LIBE Committee Study, supra note 4, at 35–36 (reiterating that the
system respects asylum seekers’ fundamental rights).
76. See LIBE Committee Study, supra note 4, at 36 (explaining how complete
free choice will protect asylum seekers and provide them with a range of
options not available under the current system).
77. See LIBE Committee Study, supra note 4, at 36 (explaining that allowing
refugees to participate in deciding where to live will reduce secondary
movement).
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needs of the EU Member States to encourage all Member States to
accept the new plan.
A. A Uniform Definition of “Refugee” Will Remove the Disparate
Granting of Refugee Status
The first major issue that the EU faces during the refugee
application process is determining whether an asylum seeker is classified
as a refugee, and therefore entitled to protection from deportation.78
The problem the EU faces on this front is that each State uses its own
interpretation of the official definition of “refugee.” Each State has
sovereignty over immigration.79
The 1951 Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees defines a
“refugee” as:
any person who, owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted
for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country
of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or
who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of
his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable
or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.
The U.N. released a Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for
Determining Refugee Status in 1979, but this handbook merely acts as
guidance because EU States have sovereignty and are not bound to
follow the criteria in the handbook.80
Because immigration decisions in the EU are made at the national
level, there have been disparate decisions regarding whether an asylum
seeker is a refugee.81 Some States may determine that an asylum seeker
is motivated by economic reasons rather than fear of persecution, while
another State may not. Often an asylum seeker has both economic
reasons for immigration and a fear of persecution.
The creation of a singular EU body that makes determinations of
refugee status based on uniform criteria would resolve this disparate
treatment. There would not be multiple interpretations, but one
78. Ucarer, supra note 20 (“The two cardinal rules of the refugee protection
regime are the definition of a refugee and the practice of nonrefoulement,
which obligates recipient states not to return asylum-seekers to a territory
where they might face danger.”).
79. J. McAdams, Interpretation of the 1951 Convention, in THE 1951
CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES AND ITS 1967
PROTOCOL: A COMMENTARY 75, 111 (2011).
80. Id.
81. See Rodda, supra note 25, at 25 (describing the tension between national
and regional interests concerning asylum).
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unifying standard for the definition of a refugee. Additionally, if the EU
creates one body to determine refugee status, then the refugee will
automatically have the same status in every Member State. This will
resolve one of the problems inherent in the Schengen structure. There
will no longer be a question regarding whether a refugee has refugee
status in a given EU State. This will protect the refugee even if he or
she chooses to move within the EU States.82
The agency could further clarify the definition of a refugee by
elaborating on some of the terms within the Geneva Convention. The
agency should define “persecution.” For example, can someone be
persecuted through economic means or does it only include the threat
of bodily harm? Finally, a clear standard should be developed for the
burden of proof that the asylum seeker must provide to establish a
“well-founded fear.” Once these standards have been agreed upon, the
new organization should also be sure to provide arriving asylum seekers
with an opportunity to be counseled on these legal standards as part of
the reception program.
Beyond clarifying the definition of a refugee, the proposed unified
body could also resolve other issues stemming from the lack of clear
definitions. The agency should determine the definition of a “sufficient
connection” to a safe third country. The agency should also come up
with a singular list of “safe third countries.”
B. Asylum Applications Should Not Be Processed Under the Policies of
The Dublin Convention
One of the benefits of having one unified processing center is that
it would provide the EU with the ability to abandon the rules of the
Dublin Convention, which currently governs the responsibility for
processing asylum claims. This standard has been highly criticized as
ineffective and the European Commission plans to reevaluate the latest
iteration of the Dublin Convention (Dublin III Regulation) in 2016.83
One failure of the Dublin Convention is that it overly burdens the
border States, which will necessarily receive the most migrant entries.
The Dublin Convention says that a refugee must remain in the State
in which the refugee firsts arrives and that the migrant can be returned
to that first-arrival State if he or she has traveled elsewhere.84 This puts
stress on the border countries such as Greece, Italy, and Hungary.85
82. See LIBE Committee Study, supra note 4, at 37 (suggesting that a central
system will provide uniform status for refugees). It is important to note
that a refugee will continue to be subject to the same standards as other
EU citizens. This is discussed in further detail later in this Note.
83. LIBE Committee Study, supra note 4, at 1.
84. Cretu, supra note 1, at 256.
85. Cretu, supra note 1, at 256.
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Another failure of the Dublin Convention is that it leads to indirect
refoulement. The Dublin Convention demands that only the first
country in which the asylum seeker lands can process the asylum
seeker’s application. This country, however, may have stricter
standards for determining refugee status. By sending a refugee back to
another country that, due to stricter standards for determining refugee
status, has a higher likelihood of returning the refugee to their country
of origin, the EU is committing indirect refoulement.86
The Dublin Convention presumes that all member States provide
equal protections from refoulement.87 However, the MSS v. Belgium and
Greece case illustrated that this is not true. The European Court of
Human Rights found that Greece and Belgium violated articles 3 and
13 of the Convention when Belgium returned asylum seekers to Greece
to be processed.88 Greece’s asylum-application system was insufficient
to prevent refoulement. Greece had application periods of up to four
years and granted asylum in only .04% of first applications and only
2.06% of appeals.89 The high likelihood that Greece would deny a
refugee application made both Greece and Belgium guilty of indirect
refoulement by processing the application in Greece.
In light of the latest refugee crisis, it has become clear that the
Dublin Convention is an insufficient tool. This is not only because the
Dublin Convention results in indirect refoulement in violation of EU
refugee principles, but also because the Convention is impractical. It
does not sufficiently account for the border-free nature of the EU. Many
asylum seekers wish to apply for asylum in Member States other than
the State in which they first arrive. Due to the ease of travel among
EU States granted by the Schengen agreement, many asylum seekers
are able to reach other States before submitting an asylum application.
The Italian Refugee Council reported that in 2014 only 64,625 of the
170,000 irregular arrivals in Italy applied for refugee status in Italy.90
Scholars believe that this indicates that asylum seekers are moving
through Italy to apply for asylum in other Member States in violation
86. See REVISITING THE DUBLIN CONVENTION: Some reflections by
UNHCR in response to the Commission staff working paper, UNHCR
(Jan. 2001), http://www.unhcr.org/en-
us/protection/operations/43662b3e2/revisiting-dublin-convention-
reflections-unhcr-response-commission-staff.html (explaining how the
disparities in the Dublin system aid in indirect refoulment).
87. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 12 (defining
refoulement as “No Contracting State shall expel or return (‘refouler’) a
refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his
life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion”).
88. Sy, supra note 40, at 471.
89. Sy, supra note 40, at 469.
90. LIBE Committee Study, supra note 4, at 34.
CaseWesternReserve Journal of International Law 49 (2017)
A More Acceptable Solution
320
of the Dublin Convention.91 The five countries that receive the most
refugee applications are Germany, Sweden, the U.K., France, and
Italy.92 Enforcing the Dublin Convention appears to be impractical
when individuals are free to move between States.
When the European Parliament meets to revisit the Dublin
Convention, it should abandon the structure entirely. It is not practical
under the Union structure and merely serves to sow animosity among
States who disproportionately share the burden of processing asylum
applications. Instead, financial aid should be given to the border
countries who necessarily carry a disproportionate burden of asylum
processing. Also, the new, unified agency should create a standardized
procedure by which a refugee can be directed to States other than the
State of first arrival for asylum-application processing. Following an
initial determination at reception sites, an asylum seeker should be able
to be redirected to a new location if the agency deems it appropriate.
C. Reception Facilities Should Focus on Speedy Processing by Working
with National and EU Officials
The structure of reception centers throughout the EU differs greatly
between Member States.93 Based on the demand on a given reception
center, a State may have more or fewer resources to devote to reception
processes. In June 2015, the European Council suggested creating an
increased number of reception facilities with official assistance from
EASO, Frontex, and Europol in Member States that are the EU entry
points (“hotspots”).94 The CEPS Paper authors believe that, while
reception conditions are important to promote humanitarian goals and
to “speed up” the application process, creating more reception centers
is an insufficient solution to the refugee problem.95 This is because
“hotspot” facilities do not have the time to process and fully determine
protection status.96
“Hotspot” facilities can be further problematic in that they can lead
to violations of human rights. The European Court of Human Rights
held that the detention conditions in Greece were inhumane in violation
of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights.97 The Court
of Justice of the EU also held that there were “systemic deficiencies in
91. LIBE Committee Study, supra note 4, at 25.
92. Varga, supra note 27, at 39.
93. LIBE Committee Study, supra note 4, at 13–14.
94. LIBE Committee Study, supra note 4, at 15.
95. LIBE Committee Study, supra note 4, at 16.
96. LIBE Committee Study, supra note 4, at 16.
97. MSS v Belgium and Greece, App. No. 30696/09 (2011).
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the asylum procedure and in the reception conditions of asylum seekers
in Greece.”98
Because reception facilities have failed to provide proper protection
or sufficient processing, the EU should not merely increase the number
of facilities, but rather the EU should change the structure of the
facilities. Reception facilities at the “hotspots” should be two-fold.
First, the facilities should have a nationally-run immigration branch.
Second, the facilities should have an EU-run asylum reception branch.
This means that the reception sites would have both national
representatives and EU representatives. The State would still be
responsible for immigration generally, but if a migrant is determined to
be a person seeking asylum, then they are sent to the EU
representatives for further processing.
The national officials should still perform the first line of processing.
The national officials will first determine if a migrant is a security risk
before allowing any further processing. If the person is a security risk,
then the State may follow its national security procedures. If the person
is not a security risk, the national official will assess whether the
migrant is seeking asylum. If the migrant is seeking asylum, then he or
she will be sent to the EU-appointed officials to deal with the
application process.
The EU appointed officials would then begin the asylum process.
These officials should conduct a pre-application survey that includes
interviewing the asylum seeker to determine in which country he or she
should be considered for asylum. This survey should include gathering
information such as where the asylum seeker has family within the EU,
what skills the asylum seeker possesses, the asylum seeker’s habits and
needs, and the asylum seeker’s preference for resettlement. These
should be weighed against profiles created by the Member States to
find the best match for processing the application. The highest weight
should be given to reuniting the asylum seeker with family.
After this determination, the asylum seeker should be scheduled for
relocation to the “temporary-stay country” while the asylum
application is processed. The “temporary-stay country” is the country
in which the asylum seeker will be granted temporary stay upon
approval of his or her asylum application. Note that under this system
there would be one agency that processes asylum applications, so the
temporary-stay country would not also process the asylum application,
but rather the EU asylum agency would be processing the application.
There should also be a time limit for the length of this initial pre-
application process, so that the asylum seekers are not merely waiting
in detention facilities or camps at the border States. It is important to
98. Case C-411/10 N.S. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department and
Case C-493/10 M.E. and others v. Refugee Applications Comm’n,
Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, 2011 E.C.R. I-13993.
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allow the asylum seekers begin to integrate into the temporary-stay
countries as quickly as possible.
Finally, it is important to consider the power that will still remain
with the Member States. If States are granted veto power over the
organization’s decisions, then this could cause “refugee in limbo”
problems. This means that the refugee would be stuck without a home
at a “hotspot.” However, it seems unlikely that the Member States
would agree to entirely relinquish power in the decision to allow people
to settle in their country. This would certainly be an aspect of the plan
that the European Parliament would have to hash out.
D. An Asylum Seeker Should Be Required to Remain in One Country
Prior to Refugee Determination, but Should Be Afforded the Same
Citizen Rights Once Temporary Protection is Granted
The policies of Syria’s neighboring countries regarding refugees
have been short-term policies based on the assumption that the Syrian
conflict would be short-lived and that the displacement would be
temporary.99 The policy of the EU at present certainly has more long-
term sustainability, but there are still many holes in the long-term
asylum policies.
One of the problems with the long-term asylum policy of the EU is
created by the Schengen structure of the EU. Currently, refugees are
required to remain in one Member State for five years following a grant
of asylum before they may travel to another State.100 Scholars have
argued that refugees should have the rights of a State citizen and that
restricting movement is not appropriate. The 2015 CEPS Paper
suggested that if the EU is able to create a system of “mutual
recognition” of refugee status, where each State would accept the
determination of another Member State, this should allow for unlimited
movement.101
As presented, the 2015 CEPS Paper suggestion for mutual
recognition of refugee status still presents a problem. Allowing refugees
to apply for refugee status, having the status granted in one State, and
then allowing this same refugee to move to another State where he or
she believes there are better job prospects could lead to an overflow of
refugees in countries like Germany. This is exactly the type of problem
of which the EU Member States are complaining. Adoption of the CEPS
Paper’s simply stated suggestion could lead to EU countries
disapproving of the idea of an independent asylum agency.
Additionally, allowing unrestricted free movement would also
undermine the entire purpose of my proposed pre-application process
of determining where to relocate a refugee. This proposed pre-
application process is meant to tackle what the EU considers to be a
99. Cretu, supra note 1, at 254.
100. LIBE Committee Study, supra note 4, at 23.
101. LIBE Committee Study, supra note 4, at 23.
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problem: secondary movement. I agree, however, that it would be
contrary to the concept of Schengen to disallow free movement.
The key to making this idea work is the creation of a uniform
organization that would determine not only where to relocate asylum
seekers, but also refugee status under a uniform definition. If all EU
States accepted the same standard for determining whether an asylum
seeker was a refugee, then there would necessarily be mutual
recognition.
As far as the free movement of the refugees is concerned, there
should not be a time limit on the movement.102 The asylum seeker
should not be allowed to move among the States while the application
is being processed, but once the asylum seeker is determined to be a
refugee, then the refugee should be allowed the same movement rights
as other citizens of the EU. This means that they can move to another
State for work or education. If the refugee is able to gain employment
or entrance to school, then the second State has less room to argue that
it is overly burdened by this secondary movement. Because there would
be a centralized asylum application process, refugees could not apply
for asylum in another Member State. If the refugee moved to another
member State where he or she couldn’t find work, then he or she would
most likely not stay there for long and the Member State would also
have the right to deport the refugee to the State under which they were
granted refugee status.
E. The Proposed Agency Should Conduct a Campaign to Promote
Tolerance of Long-Term Refugee Residence
There is definitive resistance to the idea of long-term EU residency
of refugees. Many countries are concerned that the refugees will not
integrate into their country culturally and that they will be an economic
drain. This resistance will make it difficult to get such countries to
agree to a unified plan. Some EU States have suggested that they have
a problem with accepting Muslim refugees.103 Slovakia has said that
because there are no mosques in their country, they can only accept
Christian refugees.104
Refugees only make up about 0.37% of the total EU population.105
Critics say that refugees could boost the economy by bringing young
102. Currently, a refugee is not allowed to move from the country that granted
the status for five years. Already in the EU?, EU Immigration Portal,
EUROPEAN COMMISSION (last visited Apr. 22, 2017),
http://ec.europa.eu/immigration/who-does-what/what-does-the-eu-
do/already-in-the-eu_en [https://perma.cc/4USN-F8AR].
103. Pyszko, supra note 14, at 11.
104. Pyszko, supra note 14, at 2.
105. Cretu, supra note 1, at 259.
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people into the workforce in aging populations.106 Regardless of this
information, the resistance will be difficult to overcome.
The proposed agency should initiate an active campaign to educate
resistant States about the benefits they may receive by participating in
this program. Further, the campaign should highlight that the Member
States are able to create a profile of their needs, so that they are taking
the refugees who can most contribute to their society and their
economy. It should be noted that an outright ban of a religious group
should not be acceptable on a country profile, but it will be important
to weigh the safety of the refugees with the need for even burden sharing
when dealing with States that have taken positions of limited tolerance.
F. The Proposed Agency May Need to Allocate Additional Funding to
“Hotspot” Locations
Currently, the AMIF is used to fund the Asylum System. The
AMIF requires Member States to adopt national programs to support
the CEAS, create integration strategies, and develop assisted voluntary
return.107 The EU has not offered much guidance on how to fulfill these
requirements. Annex IV published by the European Commission,
however, lists “common indicators” for how to measure these specific
objectives.108 This vagueness could be resolved by re-allocating these
duties to an independent European asylum agency.
Redirecting these funds to a unified organization should not be
difficult. There may, however, need to be additional funds acquired
from the EU to distribute to “hotspot” locations where most initial
reception costs are being incurred.
Finally, there is currently a 6000-euro-per-refugee incentive
program. Negotiating the entrance of each and every individual refugee
is likely to produce excess administrative costs. If the independent
asylum organization is given the authority to determine where to send
asylum seekers, then administrative costs could be lowered. Instead of
compensating a country for taking each individual refugee, the
organization could compensate a country by offering certain amounts
for accepting certain totals of refugees. This would likely lessen the time
spent negotiating with a country to take individual refugees and would
hopefully incentivize countries to take in larger numbers of refugees.
106. Cretu, supra note 1, at 259.
107. LIBE Committee Study, supra note 4, at 45.
108. Annex to the Communication from the Commission to the European
Parliament, the European Council and the Council: Managing the refugees
crisis: immediate operational, budgetary and legal measures under the
European Agenda on Migration, COM (2015) 490 final/2 (Sep. 29, 2015),
available at https://ec.europa.eu/home-
affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-
migration/proposal-implementation-
package/docs/communication_on_managing_the_refugee_crisis_anne
x_4_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/BHN4-5ZXF].
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This is almost the flip-side of a quota system. Rather than being
penalized for not taking in a certain number of refugees, a country is
compensated more for taking in more refugees.
V. Conclusion
The entire process of refugee determination should be a series of
steps organized through one independent organization composed of
representatives from each member country. First, upon reception, there
should be a determination on whether the applicant poses any threat
to security. This determination should initially be conducted by a
Member State’s national immigration authority. However, the EU
agency representatives should also make this determination during their
pre-application process. There should be a designated location for
processing potential-security-threat cases. If the asylum seeker does not
pose a security threat, then the receiving government should assess
whether the asylum seeker has family ties in any EU country. Family
ties should be highly influential on the final determination of a
temporary-stay location. If the asylum seeker has no family ties, then
the next consideration should be the types of skills that the asylum
seeker possesses. For example, is the asylum seeker a carpenter or a
doctor? Does the asylum seeker speak multiple languages? These factors
could be matched with the needs of the Member States. Each Member
State should create a profile of the types of skill sets that would benefit
their country. Perhaps one country needs more medical professionals,
for example, while another needs more elementary-school teachers. This
would also allow the asylum seekers to integrate more easily into the
society by being able to find a job and contribute to the economy of
the country of temporary stay. In the case of the “unskilled,” the old,
and the young, additional compromise would be needed to determine
the number of people in these groups that each country would take.
Ideally, the organization would also assess where the asylum seeker
hopes to be located while concurrently assessing where the asylum
seeker could be most easily integrated.
After this pre-application process, the asylum seeker should be sent
to the country that best suits the marriage of these factors while the
asylum seeker’s application is processed. The asylum seeker should be
confined to that country until an official determination is made.
Some may question whether this process would waste EU funds. It
is true that it would cost the EU money to transport all of the asylum
seekers to the various countries while they await determination. But, it
would also provide relief to the border States. After all, refugees have
to reside somewhere while they await a determination on their refugee
status. This process would relieve the burden on the border States while
also resolving the issue of secondary movement, thereby benefitting the
entire Union.
An independent organization that can uniformly manage refugee
applications is the most effective way to deal with the great influx of
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refugees. The fairest way to structure this organization is to have it
work with States’ national interests to find a balance between economic
and human-rights needs.
VI. Coda: Recent Developments
Since spring 2016, the EU has updated much of its asylum policy.
Although not comprehensive, this section will highlight some of the
developments.
Recently, the European Commission submitted a proposal to the
European Parliament that detailed suggested reforms to the Common
European Asylum System.109 On July 13, 2016, a proposal for a new
reception-condition directive was introduced, which is part of an EU
plan to produce a more “holistic EU migration policy.”110 Also on July
13, 2016, the European Commission created a proposal for the creation
of a regulation for a uniform status for refugees.111
109. Towards a Reform of the Common European Asylum System and
Enhancing Legal Avenues to Europe, COM (2016) 197 final (Apr. 6, 2016),
available at https://ec.europa.eu/home-
affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-
migration/proposal-implementation-
package/docs/20160406/towards_a_reform_of_the_common_european
_asylum_system_and_enhancing_legal_avenues_to_europe_-
_20160406_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/H7D3-EA92].
110. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council
laying down standards for the reception of applicants for international
protection (recast), COM 2016 465 final (Jul. 13, 2016), available at
https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-
do/policies/european-agenda-migration/proposal-implementation-
package/docs/20160713/proposal_on_standards_for_the_reception_of
_applicants_for_international_protection_en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RF5C-N2QE]; Reception Conditions, EUROPEAN
COMMISSION, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-
do/policies/asylum/reception-conditions_en
[https://perma.cc/3NMW-KJDX] (“For the first time, detailed
common rules have been adopted on the issue of detention of asylum
seekers, ensuring that their fundamental rights are fully respected.”).
111. Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
AND OF THE COUNCIL on standards for the qualification of third-
country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international
protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for
subsidiary protection and for the content of the protection granted and
amending Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003
concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term
residents, COM (2016) 466 final (Jul. 13, 2016), available at
https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-
do/policies/european-agenda-migration/proposal-implementation-
package/docs/20160713/proposal_on_beneficiaries_of_international_p
rotection_-_subsidiary_protection_eligibility_-
_protection_granted_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/SS2N-E5JV].
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The CEAS reform-proposal paper submitted in April 2016 discussed
the “significant structural weaknesses and shortcomings in the design
and implementation of the European asylum and migration policy,
which the crisis has exposed.”112 The paper insisted that for a European
asylum policy to be successful, a system must be created that is
“grounded on the principles of responsibility and solidarity.”113
The paper discussed the many problems with the current asylum
system.114 The paper highlighted the same problems addressed in the
above commentary, including the fact that Member States often diverge
in their treatment of asylum seekers due to the discretion provided in
“the current Asylum Procedures Directive and Reception Conditions
Directive.”115 The paper lists the European Commission’s top five
priorities for improving the Common European Asylum System.116
These are: (1) “establishing a sustainable and fair system for
determining the Member State responsible for asylum seekers;” (2)
“reinforcing the Eurodac system;” (3) “achieving greater convergence
in the EU asylum system;” (4) “preventing secondary movements
within the EU;” and (5) “a new mandate for the EU’s asylum
Agency.”117
To address the problems inherent in the Dublin Convention’s
directive that the first State of entry is the State to process an asylum
application, the paper makes two suggestions.118 One suggestion, which
is quite similar to my own above, is the creation of a “distribution key”
where the “relative size, wealth, and absorption capabilities of the
Member States” would be weighed with factors such as “family or
dependency links, the best interest of [a] child, and possession of a visa
or residence permit” and which would be implemented by a central EU-
level agency.119 The second suggestion is that the Dublin Convention be
supplemented by a “corrective fairness mechanism” to account for
States that have a disproportionate amount of asylum applicants.120
112. Reform of the Common European Asylum System, supra note 109, at 2.
113. Reform of the Common European Asylum System, supra note 109, at 2.
114. Reform of the Common European Asylum System, supra note 109, at 2.
115. Reform of the Common European Asylum System, supra note 109, at 4–
5.
116. Reform of the Common European Asylum System, supra note 109, at 5–
6.
117. Reform of the Common European Asylum System, supra note 109, at 6.
118. Reform of the Common European Asylum System, supra note 109, at 7–
8.
119. Reform of the Common European Asylum System, supra note 109, at 8.
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The fairness mechanism would only kick in once a Member State
reached a pre-defined limit in the number of applicants for that State.121
In addition to a “distribution key,” the paper emphasizes the
usefulness of acquiring skilled labor by integrating refugees into
societies that need them. The paper says that the EU should use a
“more proactive labour migration policy to attract the skills and talents
it needs to address demographic challenges and skill shortages.”122 The
paper mentions that “Europe is an ageing continent with a declining
working-age population, expected to shrink by 18 million in the next
decade.”123 The paper also mentions that the high employment rate
among youths in the EU is due to a lack of diversity of skills in each
Member State.124 These statistics support the proposition that bringing
in migrants with diversified skills will be necessary for the future of the
EU. These statements further support my proposal to take both the
needs of the Member States and the skills of the asylum seekers into
account when determining where an asylum seeker should be relocated.
While the paper emphasizes that the Eurodac system should be
reinforced, the paper does not explain in what way this should occur
nor does the suggestion seem to add much value to the goal of
improving the asylum system.125
Also, similar to the suggestions above, the paper proposes that “safe
third country” lists be established by EU-wide regulation.126
There are still problems with the proposal, however. The paper
suggests preventing the secondary movements of asylum seekers within
the EU by imposing an obligation on Member States to return asylum
seekers to the State in which the applicant is designated to remain,
enforcing detention conditions, and potentially revoking the right of the
asylum seeker to remain in the EU.127 As previously discussed, the
likelihood of secondary movement would likely decrease if asylum
applicants were processed in the States where they are most likely to
remain after they have been approved for asylum. Another potential
problem is that requiring States to return refugees under Schengen
would likely be difficult for the Member States. The States would have
to search actively and constantly for and interrogate asylum seekers in
order to determine if they are lawfully awaiting asylum determinations
in their country. The proposed directive bears the additional risk of
encouraging harassment of asylum seekers. It is much more practical to
121. Reform of the Common European Asylum System, supra note 109, at 8.
122. Reform of the Common European Asylum System, supra note 109, at 14.
123. Reform of the Common European Asylum System, supra note 109, at 16.
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attempt to prevent secondary movement by settling asylum seekers in
the location in which they are most likely to remain.
Another problem that arose in 2016–17 illustrates why an
independent agency that is in charge of asylum issues in Europe is so
essential. This year, Greece failed to winterize its refugee camps.128 This
occurred because the Greek migration ministry has no funds of its own
to disperse.129 Furthermore, “[n]o single actor has overall control of all
funding and management decisions in the camps.”130 The Guardian
claims that due to the lack of organization regarding funding in Greece,
the EU, UNHCR, and NGOs continue to avoid taking on their promised
responsibilities, thereby forcing smaller charity groups to attempt to
pick up the bill.131 If there was an independent asylum agency, there
would be a centralized entity that was specifically in charge of
distributing funds.
Finally, the new plans to address the EU’s refugee crisis have drawn
criticism.132 John Dalhuisen of Amnesty International has said that
these plans are smokescreens for what the European Commission “is
really trying to do,” which he says is to “resettle some refugees so they
can return more.”133 The criticism is based on the perception that these
new plans are focused on solving the problem of secondary movement
and not on refugees’ needs. This criticism is similar to one of my own.
The emphasis must always be on internalizing the problem. What can
the EU do to help refugees within its borders and help its nations to
thrive? The emphasis should not be on externalizing the refugee crisis
by removing the problem from EU shores. Obviously, the EU cannot
accept an endless stream of refugees, but it is more important and more
effective to address the problem rather than to try to avoid it. The EU
must focus its attentions on creating a proactive, long-term plan that
provides assistance to those in need, that serves the Member States’
interests, and that improves the EU’s economic stability as a whole.
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